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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The broad issue which should be considered material to the resolution of 
this appeal is. "when did the statute of [imitations begin to accrue?" Most or 
all of the other issues will be determined by the date the accruement of the statute 
of limitations began and ended in this action. The facts of the case concerning the 
statute of limitations are not disputed. Plaintiff asserts that the statute of 
limitations in Utah begins to accrue as soon as a person can maintain an action, 
and that if an optional acceleration clause is contained in the note, it is 
automatically invoked, but may extend the accrual of the statute of limitations for 
about a month. However the optional acceleration clause does not apply to a third 
party purchaser/vendee, who has not assumed the obligations of the original 
trustor. Defendant Davis claims that under Utah law, an agreement with an 
optional acceleration clause in a trust deed note, does not begin to accrue until the 
beneficiary formally invokes the optional acceleration clause. 
ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANT'S CASE LAW 
No attorney that has been in the business of being an attorney for more than 
twenty five years and having his argument soundly rejected and rebuked by the 
Supreme Court in Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., can legitimately and 
honestly claim the same argument for some undisclosed reason, now holds water. 
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This claim is without merit, especially and particularly in spite of the fact that the 
Utah cases he cites, the current case law, and statute of limitations are totally and 
unanimously against his argument as will be demonstrated. Defendant has cited, 
and relies on two out of jurisdiction cases that do not involve a third-party 
vendee/purchaser of mortgaged property, unlike the present case. 
The fact of the matter is that realistically, Defendant Davis has no Utah case 
law to base his argument concerning the statute of limitations upon. Lets analyze 
Davis' four Utah statute of limitations cases used in his brief. These cases 
purportedly expound his views concerning installment contracts in relationship to 
the statute of limitations, which are as follows: 
Nilsen-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Intern, 905 P.2d 312 (Utah App. 1995), 
Davis in this action quotes Nilson-Newey, as a way to use Johnson v. 
Johnson, a 1906 case which will be analyzed next In Nilsen-Newey an investor 
brought an action for accounting and distribution of profits. Defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss because of Investor's failure to bring an action for 35 years. 
The trial court dismissed the action on laches and the statute of limitations. The 
Utah Court of Appeals afiBrmed the dismissal. The Investor made a similar claim 
as Defendant Davis makes in this action, and The Court of Appeals stated: 
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Finally, plaintiff argues that even if laches bars its 
claims as to earlier years, each new year brings a new 
cause of action, and laches therefore does not bar its 
claims as to subsequent years This argument clearly has 
no merit with respect to Plaintiffs request for an 
accounting that spans the entire thirty five years since the 
execution of the syndicate agreement, (emphases Added) 
Just as in Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) 
where the Supreme court stated that Davis' argument was without merit, the 
Appeals Court analyzed investors argument as to the rule set in Johnson v. 
Johnson 31 Utah 408, 88P. 230 (Utah 1906) and then rejected tile argument by 
stating, "the argument clearly has no merit," that the investors case was like 
Johnson v. Johnson, and found in favor of defendants, and aflSrmed the trial courts 
ruling dismissing the action on laches and the statute of limitations. Davis 
would have this court believe the investor was victorious, when in feet the investor 
lost in district court, and on appeal respectively. 
In addition, Plaintiff in this action is a third-party vendee/purchaser that 
particular case law applies to, concerning the statute of limitations! See Taylor 
Bros. Co. v. Duden et at. 188 P.2d 995, (Supreme Court of Utah Jan 27,1948), 
which is addressed further on in this Brief. 
Johnson v. Johnson 31 Utah 408,88 PJ30. (Utah 1906). 
In this case the parties entered into a verbal agreement, providing that the 
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Defendant would pay the Plaintiff on an annual basis "one-half of the crops that 
should be produced upon the land conveyed by the deed during the lifetime of [the 
plaintiff.]" A person can't sue if it is not known what he is owed or in what 
amount he or she has been damaged, and there is no way to determine what is 
owed until the crops have been harvested. There can be many variables in a 
contract for half of the crops such as pests, crop disease, floods, early frost, etc., 
therefore it is impossible to know what the damages would be. In addition* 
Johnson is not a mortgage case, but a case for payment of one half of the crops 
produced on the land each year, and therefore does not apply to mortgages or 
deed's of trust, where the predominate payment to be made in this day and age is 
in the form of legal tender, not crops. In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Utah 
stated: 
The payments were thus to be made in yearly 
installments, and the amount there of was to be governed 
by the amount or value of the annual crops raised upon 
the land, and were to continue during the natural life of 
the respondent (Page 231) 
Furthermore, Plaintiff in the present action is a third- party 
vendee/purchaser, that special case law applies to, and if there is any conflict 
between the cases, Taylor Bros., would be the precedent setting case inasmuch as 
it is a later case! Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden et al 188 P.2d 995, (Supreme Court 
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of Utah Jan 27, 1948). Defendant and judge Toomey used Johnson v. Johnson to 
springboard out of the jurisdiction and look for cases in other states. It may be 
possible that there are special types of installment contacts with no acceleration 
clause and or other special circumstances or provisions that under certain 
circumstances might extend the statute of limitations. However the Trust Deed 
and Trust Deed note executed in favor or Mr. Simmons are of a garden variety 
executed on standard printed forms. (Defendants Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment Exhibits D & E) Therefore Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. and Loan 
757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 1988) a statute of limitations case on point would apply. 
Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co, et al 80 P.2d 471 (Utah 1938). 
Bracfdein is actually a case on point for Plaintiff in the current action and 
not Defendant, and does not state or even infer what Defendant Davis claims it 
states. The fact of the matter is the case is much like Taylor Bros*, and states: 
Mortgages 
Where note is not originally a debt of grantee of 
mortgaged premises, and granted does not sign note or 
mortgage, grantee can only be liable on express or 
implied promise to pay. 
Page 471 
The allegation that property was conveyed to 
another is probably sufficient to justify an inference of 
acceptance of title, but it does not justify inference of 
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extraneous recitals or terms in an instrument of 
conveyance. And the assumption clause is such an 
extraneous recital or term in the deed. 
Page 474 
In this case the note had a single due date and became due on that date. It 
was not an installment contract, and therefore has no merit as to defendants claim 
that the statute of limitations begins to run when each installment becomes due. 
{Bracklein page 473) And as in Johnson, Plaintiff in Bracklin is not a third-
party vendee/purchaser that special case law applies to, and if there is any conflict 
between the cases, Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden et at (Supreme Court of Utah Jan 
27, 1948), a later decided case would be the precedent setting case! 
Moab National Bank v. Keystone-Wallace Resources 517 P.2d 1020 (1973) 
In this case the Defendant signed a note with Moab National Bank, and the 
note was an installment note. However there was no acceleration clause in the 
note, and the parties, (not the court), decided to treat the note as an installment 
note. (Page 1023) Although the bank in its action may have inferred that the 
breach of contract, of not paying an installment on the note timely, made the last 
installment due, as a matter or law, it decided not to. The Supreme Court never 
stated that Moab Bank had no right to sue on the balance due of the note. What 
the parties decide to do in regards to a written contract does not change the statute 
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or case law on the statute of limitations, unless there is meeting of the minds in 
writing that effects the date the statute begins to accrue. {Statute of Frauds § 70 A-
2-201 Utah Code) The issue of no acceleration clause is the key issue here, or the 
court would not have mentioned it. The case before this court has an acceleration 
clause, so the statute of limitations began to accrue as to Plaintiff pursuant to 
Taylor in mid 1998, and expired in mid 2004. The statute of limitations begins to 
run as soon as a person can sue, or as soon as there is a complete cause of action, 
and in this action, there was a complete cause of action in mid 1998. Furthermore 
the action does not concern mortgages, and does not involve a third party vendee. 
Of course, this is an argument for obvious reasons Defendant T. Richard 
would like to avoid because he has personal knowledge that the statute of 
limitations in the State of Utah for written contracts is six years, which includes 
contracts with acceleration clauses, inasmuch as he was unsuccessful in litigating, 
Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983) a detailed statute of 
limitations case, in front of the Utah Supreme Court, and was soundly rebuked by 
that court, stating it was "without merit/' Defendant Davis has never denied this, 
nor can he! 
Defendant's argument that the statute of limitations begins to run when the 
final payment of the Trust Deed Note was missed makes no sense at all from a 
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legal point of view under Utah law. Defendant has developed no reasoned 
analysis of the cases Defendant quotes, nor Utah authority to support his point of 
view. He has only bald citations to authority, and a subjective claim as to what the 
cases state by taking quotes out of context. Inasmuch as both parties agree that 
the statute of limitations for a written contract is six years, in reality the only legal 
issue before the court is, "when does the statute of limitations begin to accrue 
in regards to a third-party, vendee/purchaser of a written contract that 
vendee did not assume?" Because of defendants lack of analysis in his brief, he 
has not adequately explained how his claim of installment obligations relate to this 
action, nor can he, using Utah law. 
Graves v. Seifried et al 87 P. 647 (Utah 1906) is a case decided by the 
Supreme court in the same year as Johnson v. Johnson and is right on point. In the 
first paragraph of the case, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
1. LIMITATION Of ACTIONS - MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE - AVAILABILITY TO THIRD 
PERSONS- Where a third person acquired an interest in 
mortgaged property under a tax deed, she could invoke 
the statute of limitations as against the mortgagee; 
though it may have been waived by, or not available to 
the mortgagor. 
This is the same standard applied to third parties who acquire mortgaged 
property, as in Taylor Bros Co., which case for some mysterious or unexplained 
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reason was not mentioned one time in Defendant's Brief. Graves is much like the 
present case except that Plaintiff acquired his property through a sheriffs deed. 
Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. And Loan, is right on point. 
The Court of Appeals specifically ruled on mortgages with acceleration 
clauses in Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. And Loan, 757 P.2d 483 (Utah App. 
1988), quoting the Utah Supreme Court in Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P. 2d 
1240, 1242 where it stated: 
"[W]hen a provision in a contact requires an act to be 
performed without specifying the time, the law implies 
that it is to be done within a reasonable time under the 
circumstances." 
This rule has been applied in the context of 
acceleration clauses in mortgage instruments. 
including due-on-sale options: (emphases added) 
The prevailing rule is that under an ordinary 
acceleration clause in a mortgage or trust deed, the 
obligee has a reasonable time after the default or the 
event which gives rise to the right to accelerate in 
which to elect to declare the indebtedness due. 
Accordingly, where . . . no definite time is specified by 
which the election to accelerate must be exercised, such 
election to do so must be exercised within a reasonable 
t ime . . . . Of course, each case must be considered on its 
own facts, and certainly, an election to accelerate a 
year or years in the future.. , . could not be 
considered reasonable under ordinary circumstances. 
(emphases added) 
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Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass % 181 Colo. 
294, 509 P.2d 1240, 1245-46 (1973). Accord Dunham v. 
Ware Sav. Bank, 384 Mass. 63 423 N.E. 2d 998, 
1000(1981); First Fed. Sav. &LoanAss'n v. Perry's 
Landing, Inc., Ohio App. 3d. 135,463, N.E. 2d 636, 648 
(1983) 
In light of the above cites, it is obvious that on page 23 of Defendant's Brief 
he purposely left out the statement by the Cooper court that an election to 
accelerate a year or years in the future,«.«could not be considered 
reasonable under ordinary circumstances. 
The Cooper Court further stated: 
[4] Deseret acted at its peril in delaying to exercise 
its option to accelerate its option to accelerate the 
remaining balance on the note. 
Furthermore the issue before the court is if Simmons sat on his right after 
mid-1998, when the last payment was made by Carman L.L.C., and that is the 
obvious reason that Defendant purposely left out Taylor Bros Co., in his brief. 
Even if Utah case law allowed Simmons to decide not to exercise his option to 
foreclose, (which it does not), Taylor Bros Co., would start the six year statute in 
mid 1998 in regards to Plaintiff. 
In as much as the Court of Appeals has quoted Colorado case law in 
Malouff; Mortgage Invest v. Battle Mountain 56 P.3d 1104 (Colo. App. 2001) 
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may be helpful inasmuch as it is a later case. In that case the court stated: 
Six year statute of limitations for actions to foreclose on 
deed of trust began to run on date of mortgagor's first 
default on the promissory note secured by the deed of 
trust. West's OR.S.A. § 13-80-103.5 
page 1105 
Where as here, any action to recover payment on a 
promissory note is barred by the six year statute of 
limitations, foreclosure on the deed of trust is also 
barred, (citations omitted) 
page 1111 
Taylor Bros. Co. V. Duden et at (Supreme Court. Utah. 1948) 188 P.2d 995. 
Utah Case Law concerning optional acceleration clauses in regards to 
3rd parties who have not formally assumed the liabilities of the trust deed 
note, starts the statute running the moment a person can sue. Taylor Bros. Co. 
v. Duden et ah, has been referred to through out this action. It was referred to in 
Plaintiffs letter to Defendant dated March 20,2007. See Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, ("Exhibit "C"). Then, Defendant caused the "scam 
memorandum* to be written by Nathan Scharton, which referred to Taylor Bros. 
Co., See Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, ("Exhibit "D")* Plaintiff 
referred to Taylor Bros. Co., Plaintiff referred to Taylor Bros. Co., on pages 4 & 5 
of his Motion for Summary Judgment. In Plaintiffs Motion to Impeach, Plaintiff 
referred to Taylor Bros. Co., on pages, 5,6, 7 &8, In Plaintiffs Motion For 
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Sanctions, Plaintiff referred to Taylor Bros. Co., on pages, 5,10 & 11. In 
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum for Motion to Impeach, Plaintiff referred to Taylor 
Bros. Co., on pages, 3,4,9, & 11. In Defendant's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant 
referred to Taylor Bros. Co., on pages, 9. In Defendant's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Cross- Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendant does not referred to Taylor Bros. Co., et al. In Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum in To Plaintiffs Verified Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff s 
Motion To Impeach Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition To Plaintiffs 
Motion For Summary Judgment, Together With Defendant's Cross Motion For 
Summary Judgment, Defendant referred to Taylor Bros. Co., on pages 5,6,7 and 
made a copy of the case Exhibit "A." of the above document. In Judge Toomey's 
Memorandum Decision and Order\ Judge Toomey referred to Taylor Bros. Co., 
on pages 3, 5, and in footnote 4 of page six where the essence of Taylor Bros. Co., 
is misstated. See Plaintiffs opening Brief page, 27,28,30,31,33,34 & 39, 
where Plaintiff clarifies and expounds on the meaning of Taylor Bros. Co., and 
now, with the full meaning of Taylor Bros. Co., exposed, Defendant in his Brief 
does not mention Taylor Bros. Co. one time. The obvious reason being that 
Plaintiffs third party status cannot be refuted, because all of the Utah cases 
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that Defendant quotes either agree with Taylor Bros. Co.. or are not 
applicable, as shown above. See also Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 p 674; 
Boucofaki v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165,104 P. 117,26 L.R.A., N.S, 898. The two 
out of jurisdiction cases that Davis cites, Anton A. Vreede, M.D., P.C. v. Koch 380 
S. E. 2d, 615 (N.C. App. 1989), and Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones 930 P.2d 
1007 (Ariz. App. Div. 2.1996)], do not include a third parly vendee/purchaser. 
The broad issue which should be considered material to the resolution of this 
appeal is simply, "when did the statute of limitations begin to accrue?" Most 
all of the other issues will be determined by this courts' decision as to the date the 
accruement of the statute of limitations began. 
DEFENDANT DAVIS KNEW THAT THE "NOTICE OF DEFAULT" 
HE PLACED ON PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WAS WRONGFUL, 
BECAUSE OF HIS REBUKE BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN 
FREDRICKSEN; FURTHERMORE, IF IN REALITY, HE DID NOT 
KNOW, HE HAD A DUTY TO CHECK THE CURRENT LAW THAT 
APPLIED TO PLAINTIFF. 
Because of Defendants rebuke by the Supreme Court, in Fredricksen, 
Defendant knew that his Notice of Default constituted a wrongful lien, because he 
knew that the statute of limitations had accrued 2 lA years earlier, yet in spite of his 
obvious knowledge of the true statute of limitations, he continues to act as though 
his argument is correct. In Centennial Investment Company v. Nuttall 171 P.3d. 
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458 (Utah App, 2007), the Court of Appeals stated: 
This court has twice considered whether a notice 
of interest recorded against real property constituted a 
wrongful lien. See Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82 
% 12, 999 P. 2d. 1244 ("The issue is whether defendants' 
Notice of Interest was expressly authorized by [statute], 
and therefore falls within the exception set out in 
subsection (a) [of the wrongful lien definition].") 
Defendant Davis acknowledges that a person must have an ownership in 
property in order to sell it quoting, In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53 f 30, 144 
P.3d 1129. "It is well settled that [a] trust is a form of ownership in which the 
legal title to property is vested in a trustee. . . " also see " Utah Code Ann. §57-
1-19-19(3) (2000). Five F9 L.L.C. v. Heritage Savings Bank SI P3d 105 (Utah 
App. 2000). 
However, because the statute of limitations had ran, Davis owned nothing, and 
therefore had nothing to sell In Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d821 
(Utah App. 1989) this court stated: 
Thus, we are not convinced that the applicable 
standard has been established in Utah "as a matter of 
law." Accordingly, the standard must be established 
factually in the course of ultimate resolution of this case, 
with a emphasis on standard-of-care-in-the-industry 
evidence. 
A reading of § 57-1-33 in it's entirety suggests 
that it is intended to operate only as a procedural guide 
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for trustees. We note in drafting § 57-l-33the 
Legislature was very explicit and went to great lengths to 
define the duties of the beneficiary and the resulting 
liability for breach of those duties. 
The footnote stated: 
8. Expert testimony may be particularly helpful in 
elucidating the standard of care applicable here. Where 
the average person has little understanding of the duties 
owed by particular trades or professions, expert 
testimony must ordinarily be presented to establish the 
standard of care. For instance., expert testimony has been 
required to establish the standard of care for medical 
doctors, Chadwickv. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); architects, Nauman v. Harold K. 
Beacher andAssocs., 24 Utah 2d 172,467 P.2d 610,615 
(1970); engineers, National Housing Indust, Inc. v. E. L. 
Jones Dev. Co., 118 Ariz, 374, 576 P.2d 1374,1377 (Ct. 
App. 1978); insurance brokers, cf Darner Motor Sales, 
Inc. V. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 
628 P.2d 388,403 (1084) (establishing standard of care 
"may require expert testimony9') 
Defendant Davis claims he can sell property with complete disregard for 
others rights by simply claiming a duty to the beneficiaries. On page 32 of his 
Brief he stated: 
Davis' duty was to the beneficiaries and the estate 
of Roy Simmons. It is clear that the interest of the 
beneficiaries and the estate of Roy Simmons are in 
conflict with the interest of Anderson. Davis did 
precisely what he was suppose to do. 
The fact is the 6 year statute of limitations had accrued and was over six 
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years after the last payment was made by Carman L.L.C. which was in July of 
1998. The end of the six year statutory period was therefore in July of 2004. 
Defendant, as a defacto trustee sold Plaintiff's property in May of 2007, nearly 3 
years after the statute had ran. Defendant's claimed allegiance and duty to the 
Estate of Roy Simmons could very well cause the Estate of Roy Simmons to be 
named in Plaintiffs federal 42 U.S.C.S §1983, civil rights action, as was explained 
on pages 14 and 15 (footnotes) of Defendant's brief. 
The "Notice of Default," Davis placed on plaintiff's property was wrongful 
pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Statute U.C.A. 1953,38-9-4, also see, Winters v. 
Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1999 App), certiorari denied 994 P.2d 1271. 
ACCELERATION CLAUSES IN UTAH ARE 
AUTOMATICALLY AND INVOLUNTARILY INVOKED 
On pages 27 through 29 Davis claims that acceleration clauses are not 
automatically invoked in Utah, but cites only his two out of jurisdiction cases to 
try to prove his claims. And as stated above the cases do not involve a third party 
vendee/purchaser, so even if they were Utah cases they would not apply. In Utah 
when a thing is to be done, the law implies it is to be done with in a reasonable 
time. In Fredericksen 667 P. 2d 34 (Utah 1983) the Supreme Court stated: 
However, when a provision in a contract requires an 
act to be performed without specifying the time, the law 
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implies that it is to be done within a reasonable time 
under the circumstances; and in case of controversay, 
that is something for the trial court to determine." 
Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, Utah, 621 P.2d 1240, (1980) 
(footnotes omitted). 
In Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. and Loan 757 P. 2d. 483 (Utah App 
1988) the court stated: 
There are ample facts in the record to support the 
trial courts conclusion that Desert's failure to enforce the 
due on sale option for more than four years after it 
learned of the sale is unreasonable. See Malouff, 509 
P.2d at 1246 (one month is reasonable, but not one year). 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's conclusion. 
Page 486 
The Cooper court did not mince words and found, one month is reasonable, 
one year is unreasonable. Furthermore, pursuant to Taylor Bros. Co., the statute of 
limitations, as to Plaintiff and his third party purchaser status began to accrue the 
minute that Simmons could sue, and ended exactly six years later. 
On page 34 of Defendant's Brief, he states, "There is no dispute that the 
Trust Deed's lien has priority to Anderson's purchase." The fact of the matter is 
that is exactly what this case is all about. Simmons' right to foreclose as to 
Plaintiff ended in July of 2004, six years after the last payment was made by 
Carman L. L. C. Another case on point is Graves v. Seifried et ah, 87 P. 674 
where a third party purchased real property in a tax sale. There was an existing 
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loan through American Savings, Loan & Building Company, which had become 
insolvent, and was no longer a going concern. A receiver was appointed in Utah 
and an action was filed. The trial court found that: 
. . .plaintiffs action was held barred by the statute of 
limitations. It was also held that the tax deed was valid, 
and that the defendants title thereunder was superior to 
plaintiffs mortgage lien. 
The Utah Supreme Court quoting the California Supreme Court went on to say: 
"But it is settled doctrine of this court, as will be seen 
from the authorities above cited, that when third persons 
have subsequently acquired interests in the mortgaged 
property they may invoke the aid of the statute as against 
the mortgagee, even though the mortgagor as between 
himself and the mortgagee, may have waived that 
protection." . . . .The theory of all the cases above 
cited is that the plea of the statute of limitations is a 
personal privilege, the rule does not extend to 
subsequent property rights over which he has no 
control." Brandenstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 29,73 Pac. 
744." 
Because the statute of limitations had ran as to plaintiff, Simmons had no 
right to Plaintiffs property. On page 36 of Davis' Brief, he asks why plaintiff 
stated that he just claimed to be a trustee. The simple reason is because the statute 
of limitations had accrued almost three years prior to Davis selling Plaintiffs 
property; and therefore Davis was not a trustee for Simmons, nor could he be as a 
matter of law, because Simmons had no interest in Plaintiffs property. However, 
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Davis had a constructive fiduciary duty to plaintiff. §22-1-1 Utah Code defines 
"fiduciary" as: 
"Fiduciary" includes a trustee under any trust, 
expressed, implied, resulting or constructive . . . . 
and any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for 
any person, trust or estate. 
The key words are "constructive", and "resulting." Defendant is a 
constructive fiduciary to Plaintiff because in reality, he, (by filing a notice of 
default) forced himself into being a de facto trustee in regards to Plaintiffs 
property, which by definition is a "wrongful lien" pursuant to the "Wrongful Lien 
Statute." (U.CJL 1953, 38-9-4) Then, to add insult to injury, and with the 
undeniable knowledge of his rebuke by the Utah Supreme Court in Fredricksen, 
Davis unlawfully sold Plaintiffs property, with total disregard for Plaintiffs 
property rights. Because Simmons had no interest in plaintiffs property, Davis' 
only duty was to Plaintiff pursuant to common law (Bogart § 421); as an 
involuntary trustee, which by his actions Davis forced upon himself. Under 
California Civil Code, § 2223, a Involuntary trustee, is defined, as "One who 
wrongfully detains a thing is an involuntary trustee thereof for the benefit of the 
owner." Clearly, the simple fact is that the only fiduciary duty owed was, and still 
is to Plaintiff! Defendant also has a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff pursuant to Blodgett 
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v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978), which stated, "[o]bviously, a trust 
deed trustee may n o t . . . defraud a trustor." 
Finally, Plaintiff has at all times stated that he believes that Roy Simmons 
was paid in full on the note with Carman L.L.C., Defendant claims that Roy 
Simmons purposely waited to see if he was going to get paid when the last 
payment was due on the trust deed note, which was approximately eight years 
later. This argument makes no sense at all, inasmuch as shortly after the original 
trust deed and note were agreed to by Simmons, and Carman L. L. C , the subject 
property was deeded to E. L. Whitehead, (Defendants Brief 13), and Carolyn 
Manning, the signer of the note for Carman L. L. C , was sent to prison for 5 years. 
{Manning v. State 122 P. 3d 628 (Utah 2005) A aging person with serious health 
problems is not inclined to wait five years for someone to get out of prison to 
determine whether or not they are going to pay. An aging person is usually trying 
to get their affairs in order. Roy Simmons is now deceased, which makes this 
exactly the type of stale claim for which the statute of limitations was enacted. 
Finally, pursuant to the Professional Rules of Conduct, and Rule 11 of the 
URCP, and Rule 40 (a) URAP require attorneys and parties to reasonably inquire 
as to the facts and law before a document is signed and filed. See Appellant's 1st 
Brief page 45. Davis has a duty to be straight forward with this court and not 
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distort what the case law really means. As plaintiff stated in District Court, the 
way Defendant Davis portrays ths case law is a bikini bathing suit. What it shows 
is surprising, but it hides is vital. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff has clearly shown that the statute of limitations in the State of Utah 
as to Mortgages begins to accrue as soon as a person can sue, and runs for six 
years. If the Note contains an optional acceleration clause, that clause may extend 
the note for about another month. However optional acceleration clauses do not 
apply to third parties-vendee/purchasers, and the statute of limitations begins to 
run as soon as the beneficiary can maintain an action. 
Inasmuch as the statute of limitations had ran as to plaintiff, the "notice of 
default," placed on plaintiffs property by Davis constituted a "wrongful lien," 
and plaintiff is entitled to treble damages, because Davis refused to remove the 
wrongful lien. 
Defendant Davis, the attorneys that participated in the distortion of the law, 
and defrauded plaintiff of his property, and the law firm of Callister Nebeker and 
McCullough should be sanctioned, as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
This is simply a case of an attorney's ego getting in the way of his good 
judgment and his highly respected knowledge of the law. In spite of Davis' 
rebuke By the Utah Supreme Court in Fredricksen, he disregarded the Supreme 
Court's decision in Fredricksen, and with his ego strongly intact, and by some yet 
to be discovered tactic, Davis somehow persuaded Judge Toomey to sign a 
"memorandum and order," that had nothing to do with Utah law, either statutory 
or case law. Davis obviously twisted the arms, of his fellow attorneys to go along 
with his fictional theory as to statute of limitations law, when in fact he had 
absolute knowledge of the true law because of his above mentioned rebuke by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Fredricksen; which for some strange phenomenon is not 
mentioned in any of his writings in this action. He has just not accurately stated 
what the cases he cites mean in regards to the statute of limitations. Furthermore, 
he completely ignores Taylor Bros. Co, et aL9 and wants this honorable court to 
go along with his outlandish legal claim as to when the statute of limitations 
begins to run in the State of Utah; and tries to persuade all involved by using out-
of-the-jurisdiction case law, with complete indifference to Utah case law. 
Plaintiff in his pleadings, jokingly stated that Davis could call any first year 
law student to find out what the law in Utah is in regards to the statute of 
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limitations, and at all times called the memorandum by Scharton a "scam 
memorandum." For these jokes, Davis claims Plaintiff is unprofessional. In fact 
with the obvious rebuke by the Supreme Court at all times in the back of his head, 
Davis has the gull to claim he was just trying to assist Plaintiff to understand what 
was happening with Plaintiffs property, which seems to Plaintiff, pursuant to 
Davis' rebuke by the Supreme Court in Fredricksen, as about as unprofessional as 
a lawyer can get, pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct (Davis' Brief 
page 30) 
In addition to the grief Davis has caused as mentioned above, he has caused 
Plaintiff to work on this case for more than a year forcing Plaintiff to spend 
hundreds of hours, and thousands of dollars, and forcing this court to review this 
case, which for all intents and purposes was decided in Fredricksen. There exists, 
no public law library in the Uintah Basin, which has caused Plaintiff to travel to 
Salt Lake City numerous times for his legal research. Davis has sold Plaintiff's 
property with no hesitation or any regard as to the position that the unlawfol 
trustee's sale placed Plaintiff into financially. In light of all of the above, with a 
giant ego Davis argues that neither he or his attorney Thomas Price, or others 
should be sanctioned. For the above stated reasons, the District Court's Decision 
should be reversed, and Plaintiff should be awarded costs and attorney's fees. 
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